## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

6 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

VIA

: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT

: Focus of the National Intelligence Council

- 1. The basic intellectual thrust of the National Intelligence Council should be that of identifying future trends, examining potential future scenarios, and acting as the intelligence counterpart of the traditionally moribund policy planning apparatus. The result of this interaction should be to stimulate strategic thinking government-wide. This focus is not to supplant the Council's policy functions, Intelligence Community management, private sector contact roles, or estimates production.
- Intensification or initiation of the following activities would enhance this forward-leaning focus.
  - A. Initiate an ongoing institutional dialogue between the Council and policy planning elements in State (SP under Steve Bosworth); NSC (Norm Bailey); and Defense (Ikle, Marshall, also peripherally Perle and Armitage). We have started this process.
  - B. Initiate seminars with the above offices, designed to stimulate strategic thinking on key policy issues. We have commenced such a series on Soviet perceptions with DoD's Net Assessments Office, and have scheduled an initial seminar on various contingency situations with State's Policy Planning Office. Other intelligence community involvement will be selectively desirable.
  - C. Within this policy planning community, distribute responsible, avowedly speculative, informal pieces on potential consequences of

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contingency future situations. This process has started. NIOs are in an ideal position to engage in such thinking.

Schedule a series of "vulnerability estimates" on key countries hostile to US interests. At the DCI's instigation, we are now with a focus on developing such a product economic, political, and paramilitary vulnerabilities. This pattern could usefully be applied, besides

It would

provide an in-depth backdrop to whatever actions may be deemed desirable in the future against these countries. Too often, a "quick-fix" approach is now applied, without requisite background study, when a crisis situation arises. Particularly if the quick-fix is political action, in-depth analysis should be available as a result of dispassionate prior deliberations. Intelligence Community components, in addition to CIA, should be engaged in these efforts.

- E. Various non-traditional academic methodologies of forecasting instability or key evolving situations have been considered and sporadically tested in ORD/DDS&T; DDI/CPAS; and the DDI instability center. Most concerned elements agree the most promising of these is the expected utility who is under contract to ORD. The NIC should undertake to initiate use of this and possibly other promising systems in its estimative process -- both for immediate value of challenging assumptions of analysts and also to establish a valid track record for them. If proven useful, selected methodologies may later be adopted for CIA internal analytical purposes.
- F. In order to guide future collection efforts -- in tasking, recruiting, and elicitation -- an integral portion of each National Intelligence Estimate should be to formulate statements of informational needs and gaps for

Nowhere is more interest shown by field elements in analytical productions than when they are asked to comment on estimates. This natural proclivity should be exploited as a mechanism, supplementing more formal but somewhat ponderous systems currently in use.

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